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IS THINKING LIKE A LA WYER
ENOUGH?
Sallyanne Payton*

We could actually train legal minds here -A Student
Every year that I attend meetings of the Law School's Com:
mittee of Visitors I ask members of the committee how the
school might improve the training that we give to our graduates.
Every year until this one the lawyers who have responded to this
question have given a standard answer: the young lawyers are
smart, they say, smarter in many respects than their seniors, but
they don't know how to write well. This response usually leads
to a discussion of the proper place of skills training in the law
school curriculum; lawyers and professors engage in a little
jousting over the relationship between theory and practice, and
all together lament the literary deficiencies of law students, compared, presumably, to ourselves.
This year, however, when I asked the visitors how legal education might be improved, I heard a new observation, one that
strikes more plainly at the heart of the enterprise of legal education. One of the visitors, a senior partner in a distinguished eastern law firm, remarked straightforwardly that his new people are
competent enough at doing legal analysis, but lack judgment, indeed resist being asked to exercise judgment, when it comes to
actually devising a course of action to recommend to a client.
Other visitors listening to the answer nodded agreement.
Lack of judgment? Is that not the standard complaint of the
mature against the young, even the talented young? Is not judgment exactly the quality that is acquired through experience
and reflection-in practice? Should not the humility and reticence of recent graduates be regarded as a virtue rather than a
defect, in light of the legendary brashness of youth? In any
event, is it not reasonable to assume that the judgment problem,
if there is one, will just work itself out over time? Should the law
schools take to heart this kind of criticism?
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A., 1964, LL.B., 1968, Stanford
University.
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It would be tempting to say that training young lawyers to
have judgment is not the bailiwick of the law schools, just as
intensive skills training is not; but a suggestion that a lawyer
lacks judgment amounts to an accusation of professional incompetence, which surely reflects, even at some remove, on the quality of his or her training. The central purpose of formal legal
education should be to equip young graduates with the techniques of inquiry and reasoning that make them fast learners,
persons to whom professional responsibility comes naturally and
in whom sound judgment develops without strain. Although it
has traditionally been understood that even the most academically talented beginning lawyers must rely on their first employers to provide the apprenticeship that makes them fit to represent actual clients, it has been assumed that the drill in case
analysis that is the heart of legal education bestows the basic
cognitive tools that young lawyers need in order to learn quickly
on the job.
Viewed against this history, the visitor's observation is troubling, because it hints that the standards by which young lawyers
are judged by their employers may be becoming less generous.
This may seem a large speculation to found on a random remark, but the remark fits all too well the emerging competitive
reality of law practice. It is only to be expected that lawyers who
themselves must meet increasingly stringent market tests will
have less time to teach, less time to provide feedback, and less
patience than was the case in more leisurely and prosperous .
times. 1
·
At the same time, the coJJ.ditions of advancement within law
firms are likely to become more complicated. Law firms are becoming large complex organizations. During the last decade a
large number of firms have grown to have more than 150 lawyers; it has become common for the largest firms to have offices
in several cities. The path to success in these enterprises is uncharted; however, some strains and contradictions are already
becoming apparent. The very size of the firms points toward increasing routinization of tasks and standardization of product,
implying specialization, hierarchy, and internal dynamics of the
sort associated with bureaucracy; yet a consulting law firm survives only by the personal entrepreneurship of its lawyers.
Young lawyers may thus find that by the time of the partnership
1.

For a parallel observation, see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-AMERICAN BAR AssocIA-

TION COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, ENHANCING THE COMPETENCE
OF LAWYERS

77 (1981)

[hereinafter cited as ENHANCING THE COMPETENCE OF LAWYERS].
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decision they are expected to have achieved an ideal combination of technical mastery, professional judgment, success within
the organization itself, and ability to attract and retain clients.
The fulcrum on which all these evaluations must turn is whether
the lawyer has good judgment, which is the foundation of other
professional virtues.
Viewed in this light, standard legal education appears problematic. Law schools do not convey to the students vividly
enough the truth that an intellectually disciplined astuteness
about institutions and people contributes as much to the actual
craft of lawyering as does the ability to do technically sound legal reasoning. In fact, the latent message of the instructional
program may be that the hallmark of the lawyerly mind is precisely its singleminded focus on the law and legal issues-that is,
on those issues that may be the occasion for litigation-to the
exclusion of all else. 2 What is not conveyed with sufficient clarity
is the fact that the lawyer must be engaged intellectually with
the world in order to appreciate what legal issues may arise and
how they might be dealt with. We might improve legal education, then, by giving students more opportunity to exercise their
reasoning abilities in contexts that allow them to understand
how the specific skill of "thinking like a lawyer" fits into what
one student of practicing professionals has called the "reflective
conversation with the situation" 3 that is the larger task of active
lawyering. While we cannot teach students to exercise the arts of
the practicing lawyer, we could do more to help them develop
the wider range of thinking skills that they must exercise as
lawyers.
In the process, we might do well to take a harder look at just
what happens to students intellectually while they are in law
school. Consider the mental skills and mindsets that are characteristically induced by law school training. First, there is the absorption with courts, specifically the appellate courts. Relentless
exposure to appellate opinions has the beneficial effect, much
like intensive language training, of giving students an opportunity to acquire a feel for the rhythms and cadences of the conversations in which they will later participate. However, missing
from the texts is a sense of what that actual conversation is like,
how the parties shape the discourse. The judicial opinions do
2. See Van Valkenburg, Law Teachers, Law Students, and Litigation, 34 J.
Enuc. 584, 597-99 (1984).
3. See D. ScHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: How PROFESSIONALS THINK
TION (1983).
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not convey a vision of the lawyer, or for that matter the judge,
as a storyteller, creating legal stories from the raw stuff of actual
disputes, sculpting arguments from texts, making usable history
in the process of fashioning "precedent" out of prior cases. A
good law teacher will of course reach around the appellate opinion to encourage students to imagine the parties, the transaction, the actual dispute, the process;• but the time available for
such speculation is limited and the supply of suitable materials
sparse. By default of critical views and alternative sources of information, therefore, the student may come to accept the versions of reality that are placed before him every day by the authorities even though in theory he knows that there is something
more to these documents than meets the eye. Indeed, a certain
willingness simply to absorb the judicial view is functional, since
the student must train himself or herself to see the world as
judges see it in order to anticipate correctly how judges will behave. One must learn the language of judicial discourse, even if
it means putting aside one's own world view.
The further sacrifice that one makes in the first year, from
which one may never recover, is the sacrifice of one's common
sense, or general intelligence. Indeed, it is essential in the first
year of law school to separate the students from their unexamined views and values, in the interests of inculcating habits of
analytic rigor. I suppose that we assume that there will be time
later for the students to recover what is valuable of their old
selves and to integrate their previous lives with their lives as
lawyers; but the institution gives them little enough encouragement or opportunity to do so, and very little indication of how
that task can be accomplished consistent with the professional
detachment that is induced in the first year. These are not insignificant sacrifices: not every profession requires its practitioners
to relinquish so much of themselves in order to undergo basic
professional socialization. The payoff is supposed to be that one
emerges from the first year having acquired the widely touted
skill of "thinking like a lawyer."
•
The consensus of generations of lawyers is that the person
who has actually learned to think like a lawyer and who has
used his or her legal education as a window onto the world has
developed a set of thinking skills that can be turned to any practical intellectual task with impressive results. Certainly my own
observations are consistent with the collective wisdom. Whether
4.
K.

There is no more eloquent affirmation of the teacher's role in doing just this than
(1930).

LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH
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law schools are entitled to claim the most versatile members of
the profession as representative, however, is questionable. I
would think that the true measure of -law training is the impact
that it has on the thinking apparatus of the middling student
who wants only to get reasonably good grades in law school and
to acquire what preparation he or she can for the conventional
private practice of law. Viewed from this perspective, it must be
pointed out that the effects of a legal education may not be
wholly salutary. One can graduate from law school not quite
having acquired the full benefit of skill in legal analysis 5 but
having had one's spirits and general intelligence depressed and
one's vision narrowed. It may take one some time to recover
from legal education.
The folklore is otherwise. Past successes of the legal profession have given legal educators reason to believe that the skill of
"thinking like a lawyer" fits comfortably into general intelligence, indeed may even augment that intelligence with analytical skills of special sharpness. In their more grandiose moments,
enthusiasts of legal education6 -law school deans, for example-may even claim that lawyers are smarter than other kinds
of people, better at solving problems, more to be entrusted with
matters of importance, omnicompetent. And in real life most law
graduates have learned to use the kind of judgment that is exercised routinely by intelligent people doing tasks at which they
plan to succeed.
This intellectual integration has historically been achieved,
however, not during formal schooling but during the first years
of practice. There is therefore cause to worry. If the quality of
the average apprenticeship yields to the galloping commercialization of law practice, law schools may have to take on more
responsibility for educating students to exercise professional intelligence. Even the major firms are asking for students who can
"write better," by which they plainly mean that they want graduates who can not only construct a paragraph but also shape an
argument. There is also a growing demand for more clinical education and skills training, which can be understood as a response
to the perception that entering lawyers need more systematic instruction in basic practice skills, particularly if they are not
likely to have the benefit of an apprenticeship. Although the law
5. See Bryden, What Do Law Students Learn? A Pilot Study, 34 J. LEGAL Eouc. 479
(1984).
6. For an unusual twist to the argument, see Llewellyn, The Crafts of Law Re• Valued, 15 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 1 (1942), reprinted in K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 316
(1962).
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schools' responses to demands for expensive training of this sort
have been deliberate, the current weight of informed opinion
certainly leans toward accommodating the demand in a manner
consistent with the institutions' basic academic mission.
My own reason for favoring such programs, however, is not
that they enhance students' technical competence as lawyers,
but that they engage the students' general intelligence in the doing of tasks in which the students are responsible for outcomes.
In clinical and skills courses, students must engage in a continuous process of thinking and learning from their own activity, integrating intellect with performance, theory with practice. The
most beneficial of such courses are those that combine active
learning with organized instruction to help students gain systematic, theoretical understanding of why some actions succeed
and others fail; 7 but even if the courses do not offer much in the
way of theory they can provide opportunities for students to use
their own heads and exercise their own courage.
Perhaps I should make it clear here that I am hunting small
game. This is not a radical critique of the legal profession, nor a
proposal for wholesale reform of legal education. I assume that
most students of this and other major law schools will continue
to find employment with law firms or conventional public sector
institutions and that the students desire mainly to be regarded
upon entry into their jobs as good technical lawyers with adequate general judgment. The kinds of deficiencies in lawyers'
training that I am focusing on are, therefore, those that may
lead to inadequate representation of clients, including regular
commercial clients. They may also lead to other objectionable
behaviors, but those are beyond the scope of this essay.
My thesis here is that formal legal education, in addition to
being by no means an education in lawyering, affirmatively inculcates in law students a characteristic pattern of blind spots
that a good lawyer must overcome if he or she is to represent
clients competently, assuming that the goal is to serve clients
and not to exploit them (exploitation being one of the topics
that is beyond the scope of this essay). Examples of inadequate
lawyering are not difficult to find; I shall use only two (real)
anecdotes for illustration. Both were told to me by the clients,
who fortunately knew better than their counsel. The first example is that of the lawyer who, being unaware of the existence of
the California Coastal Commission, advised his client to take ad7. See Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. LEEouc. 612 (1984).
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vantage of an apparent bargain price on a piece of undeveloped
real estate fronting on the Pacific Ocean just south of Big Sur.
The second example is that of the lawyer who, not bothering to
find out that his client's financial stability depended on the continued patronage of a large firm with a wide choice of suppliers,
attempted to persuade the client to sue that firm over a contract
dispute arising out of a minor transaction.
Lawyers in good firms would probably doubt even the basic
competence of lawyers who made such errors; however, mistakes
of judgment of this kind ought not be regarded merely as random failures, personal to the lawyers involved. They are errors
of a certain type, symptomatic of the style of analysis that is
affirmatively taught in law school. Take the example of the lawyer who did not know about the California regulatory scheme.
As a student the lawyer would have had the standard course in
property law, in which he would have learned a little about land
use regulation, probably through reading appellate judicial opinions involving constitutional challenges to local zoning ordinances. Most of his property course, however, would have been
taken up with the study of private-law doctrines. So, for that
matter, would have been most other first-year courses in which
the substantive "law" that is studied has been established
mainly by courts settling disputes among private parties. Other
kinds of law being off to one side in the law school courses, it is
too easy to infer that they are also off to one side in life. The
first-year "law" curriculum does not condition students to think
instinctively of statutes and regulations as sources of law, nor
alert them to the fact that public law systems blanket the legal
landscape and are responsible for many arrangements that the
students may take for granted in the social order. Although the
students' mental model of the lawmaking system may be corrected later either in law school or in practice as they gain exposure to or experience in public law areas, the unexamined basic
model acquired during that crucial first year of law school may
remain latent, with the potential to induce error, sometimes dramatic error, as the example suggests.
The second example, that of the lawyer who advises his client
to invoke the judicial process inappropriately in the contract
dispute, exemplifies another characteristic intellectual failure of
lawyers that must be blamed on legal education. In the context
of the law school classroom, students are trained to narrow their
vision, to see legal issues rather than disputing persons. Although it is essential to curb the students' responses to the identities of the disputing parties or their actual relationships to one
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another where such matters are legally irrelevant, the hazard is
that successful law students may acquire a disciplined habit of
disregarding the human or transactional contexts of legal disputes, a habit that must be unlearned in practice.
Some of these undesirable effects of legal education can be
counteracted while the students are still in school. For example,
in order to accustom students to the use of non-judicial sources
of law we might introduce more statutory material into the firstyear curriculum, and use as examples of reasoned decisionmaking the opinions of non-judicial bodies such as administrative
agencies, whose output is often of a higher intellectual quality
than that of the judiciary. It would be useful, in other words, to
introduce first year students to something like the full range of
legal texts that they will have to be able to use as lawyers, as a
way of keeping before their eyes the full range of lawmaking institutions of which they need to be aware.
Simply teaching students about public law would not, however, cure the more pervasive deficit in legal education, which is
the almost entire lack of training in or even exposure to the exercise of situational judgment. Such judgment cannot be taught;
but formal education can lay the intellectual foundations for its
exercise. It is therefore appropriate to ask whether the particular
objects on which the lawyers' practical intelligence must be engaged are susceptible to being understood systematically and
can be explored in a classroom format.
Asking the question points out, however, how little we know
about what practicing lawyers do, or how they evaluate professional competence. The vocabulary in which peer judgments are
made is underdeveloped and unstandardized; and it is probably
the case that what good lawyers recognize in one another is a
quality of mind rather than mastery of some set of specific technical skills or subject matters. If as law teachers we were to take
seriously the task of growing good legal minds, we might do well
to identify and foster deliberately the development of the
mental qualities that good lawyers regard as indicators of high
professional ability in other lawyers. 8
Some of these qualities are not difficult to identify, and perhaps to stimulate through formal education. 9 One such quality is
My suggestion echoes that of former Dean Bayless Manning. See ENHANCING THE
or LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 417, 432-33 (address of Bayless A. Manning).
9. I am assuming, somewhat against the evidence, that the traditional law school
courses are doing an adequate job of teaching legal analysis. While this kind of core
training could be improved vastly, the problems of the core curriculum are beyond the
scope of this essay.
8.

COMPETENCE

WINTER

1985)

Thinking Like a Lawyer

241

peripheral vision, an ability to perceive what is going on in the
total environment, to understand how things connect. Lawyers
with well-developed peripheral vision can be awesome in their
ability to look at problems from many different perspectives, to
see not only what is presented but what is not presented, to
think across doctrinal categories, to spot threat or opportunity
originating from outside of what seem to be the boundaries of a
problem. Another outstanding quality of good lawyers is an ability and willingness to appreciate a client's problem in the full
context in which the client experiences it. A third, which is less a
quality than a capability, is an ability to design successful
courses of action that accomplish the client's legal objective in a
satisfactory manner in the context of the client's total situation.
To a substantial extent the talent that underlies these abilities
is simply that of being a fast learner. Good lawyers are quick
studies. But even learning is learned behavior-that is, we learn
to think. It therefore ought to be possible to help law students
acquire mental habits that will enable them to learn quickly and
systematically from experience. There are two points to be made
here, both of which derive from the fact that fast learning is
based on pattern recognition. The first is that some of what lawyers need to know about the world can actually be taught in law
school. In light of the quantity of academic energy that has been
devoted over the past several decades to the study of major institutions and social sytems, it is not necessary for students to
go out into the world of commercial law practice knowing nothing about, for example, the banking system, or the telecommunications system, or the systems through which energy and natural
resources are brought into the economy and distributed; nor is it
necessary for students to enter worlds based on standard social
institutions such as private ordering through contract without
the benefit of the systematic insights into contracting behavior
now available in the scholarly literature. Even students who can
learn rapidly on their own can profit from being given a disciplined analytical framework on which to hang their own insights,
or against which to test their own learning. The second point to
be made is that quite apart from any specific information that
might· be taught, law schools would do well to encourage students to develop habits of systematic iriquiry into and analytical
thought about subjects other than legal doctrine. The sooner the
student is exposed to the need to act in the wider world the
sooner he or she will realize that there is considerable professional payoff to having the intelligence "on" at all times.
It should be clear by now that I am suggesting that we add a
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different sort of learning to the law school curriculum, one that
helps the lawyer exercise his or her role not mainly as lawyer but
as smart generalist, as counselor, problem-solver, and transaction builder. These tasks are at the heart of many lawyers' practices but they are tasks for which lawyers receive no training,
and in which lawyers have no particular comparative advantage.10 For the task of putting together a major business deal, for
example, there may be little intrinsic reason to prefer a smart
lawyer to a smart person trained in management or finance, particularly if the strictly legal aspects of the transaction are not its
most complicated or problematic. Historically, law firms have
claimed this type of work because they could plausibly maintain
that the skill of legal analysis made lawyers better than other
professionals at managing difficult and complex problems that
cut across disciplinary lines. Partly for this reason, partly because law has always been a path to public service, the law degree has for the past half-century been the credential of choice
for the intelligent, ambitious generalist, who could be reasonably
assured that armed with a lawyer's mind he could find his way
to the most interesting problems in any field that he touched.
Relative to this tradition, however, some of the changes in the
structure of the legal profession ought to be read as warning
signs. The prospect of law practice in the gargantuan multicity
law firms that have risen in recent years may be less attractive
to the adventurous mind than were the prospects for practice in
even the largest law firm of two decades ago. Law firms may
come to be challenged in their transaction-making function by
other entities such as management firms or multidisciplinary organizations, in which lawyers are members of professional teams
that may be headed by persons with other backgrounds. Some of
the creative generalist side of lawyers' business may shift to
other types of generalist professionals. Since very bright young
people can be expected to seek the degree that will lead them to
where they think the action will be, any shift away from law as
the center of action in the real world must have a negative effect
on law schools' ability to attract the most promising lights of
rising generations.
What do I suggest? Not, for the moment, a wholesale revision
of the law school curriculum, although I think it likely that substantial changes may finally prove inescapable under the press
of outside challenge. In the short term, the kind of improve10. For an elaboration of this theme, see Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 241, 294-313 (1984).
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ments that I am advocating can be accommodated by the traditional device of inserting into the curriculum some additional
second- and third-year elective courses, designed however on a
new principle. That principle is that the training of lawyers includes the systematic study of the organizations and institutions
that populate the working lawyer's actual environment-not the
"law" governing them, but the things themselves. Why institutions? Because the study of organizations and institutions really
is the path to understanding how the contemporary world works.
This is not an exotic suggestion, only a bow in the direction of
acknowledging the realities of contemporary law practice. Most
lawyers spend most of their professional lives dealing with organizations and persons playing organizational roles-representing
them, putting together deals for them, arguing or bargaining
with them, or litigating against them. For the majority of our
students who intend to have careers as outside counsel to business firms, "the client" who must be satisfied is likely to be a
particular corporate manager or inside lawyer whose perception
of the value of the consulting lawyer's services, or of the quality
of the lawyer's judgment and advice, may hinge in large part on
how usefully the outside lawyer complements the insider's own
role within the organization. Some lawyers live in worlds in
which virtually all the actors are members of complex
organizations.
Legal education presently provides students with virtually no
understanding of organizations and of the behavior of persons
acting within or on behalf of organizations. Organizations are
discussed mainly as juridicial entities, seen from the outside
through the eyes .of courts or legislatures. In nearly all law contexts except those in which we are specifically trying to decide
whether to hold an organization responsible for the acts of its
agents, we speak of governments or of corporations as though
the actual actors were the corporate entities, not the people
within them, and as though the organizations worked on a command-and-control model of internal governance. 11 We thus ignore much of the real complexity of organizational behavior.
The practical effect is to leave students with an incorrect mental
model of the actual world of organizations that they will encounter as lawyers, a model that they will have to lay aside in order
to function intelligently. The current fashion of bringing
microeconomics into the law school classroom only compounds
11. For further discussion, see Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1 (1980).
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this problem, since most microeconomic theory treats the business firm as a singleminded profit-maximizer, a construct that is
controverted by nearly all students of actual business behavior.
Insight into the behavior of individual organizations needs to
be coupled with insight into how the total system functions. Students graduate in ignorance even of the legal system. It seems
odd that law students gain in their ordinary courses virtually no
systems-level insight into the workings of official lawmaking institutions and the relationship between law of all types and private ordering. For example, despite the fact that American law
is virtually incomprehensible withou_t, some appreciation of the
complexities of the federal system, law students typically do not
even learn enough about federalism or the separation of powers
in government to be able to give a comprehensible explanation
of the theoretical underpinnings of the American system of government to a group of high school students. Law schools even
teach them little or nothing about the active functioning of the
court system viewed as a system, and naturally nothing about
how courts work as institutions. When it comes to non-judicial
public ordering law students are typically helpless: they regularly enter the practice of law knowing nothing of the workings
of non-judicial official lawmaking institutions such as legislatures and administrative agencies and so little about constitutional structure that they would not know where to begin in
drafting a set of by-laws for a voluntary organization, much less
a charter for a government. On the side of private ordering, lawyers characteristically are unfamiliar with the inner workings of
the numerous private governments that control items of high
economic value such as institutional accreditations, sports
franchises, professional certifications, and seats on stock exchanges. And ironically in view of the fact that many of our students intend to become the plumbers and electricians, even the
architects and builders, of the capitalist order, they learn little
of how capitalism works, or of the organization of industry, or of
the relationship between business and the state.
It can of course be argued that smart people catch on to how
the world works once they enter practice. That is true to a point,
indeed has always been the case. However, the type of learning
that occurs in any active setting tends toward the anecdotal-that is, a lawyer may achieve specialized mastery of a particular institutional terrain without ever achieving the kind of
integrated understanding that makes knowledge transferable.
There is therefore reason to acquire understanding of basic
structures while one has leisure to do so, in order to know what
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questions to ask when one finds oneself in unfamiliar territory.
Systems-level understanding is what gives good lawyers their resourcefulness and peripheral vision, their feel for context, their
ability to anticipate the full range of legal issues and arguments
that might be available to a client and to understand how a client's cause should be positioned to enhance the likelihood of
favorable outcomes.
It can be argued that I am echoing the traditional urging that
law school become a form of education in the liberal arts, including the liberal art of governance, and I think that would be a fair
characterization of my position. However, my main concern is
for the development of competent professional minds; and that
sets some limits both on what I would try to teach and how I
would try to teach it. The beginning of wisdom in this area is
probably that what needs to be known cannot be taught, at least
not to the young. Aristotle pointed out that one cannot appreciate lectures on political science unless one is "versed in the practical business of life from which politics draws its premises and
subject-matter." 12 The same observation applies to lawyering:
one cannot be taught it until one has done it. And neither can a
person learn in the classroom all that he or she will ultimately
need to know about the systems through which our collective
lives are <;>rdered.
What we can do, however, is to introduce students to the traditions, ideas, and styles of thinking that are embedded in various institutions. I would be more interested in enhancing students' repertoires of thinking styles than their stores of
information. What is important is to introduce law students to
the ways in which the people who manage the non-judicial institutions think, how they use information, how they regard incentives and assess risks, how they view themselves in their own
environments.
Here we come back to the main theme of this essay, which is
the problem of ensuring that the law school experience promotes
rather than hinders the process of developing good professional
judgment. At the point at which students graduate from law
school they ought to be able to think, not just "think like lawyers"; the way to get them into the habit of thinking is to introduce them to responsible, purposive reasoning wherever
possible.
The key adjective is "purposive." Nearly all institutional
12. THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (J.A.K. Thomson trans.
1953, H. Trednnick rev. trans. 1976).

246

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 18:2

thinking is done with some purpose in mind. Business corporations, private voluntary associations, and government administrative agencies engage in willed, deliberate action directed toward the achievement of ends that are explicit and often
measurable. A business sets out to develop and market a product; a sorority sets out to build a complicated national network
of membership organizations; the federal Environmental Protection Agency sets out to give the nation clean air; the local park
and planning commission sets out to create an integrated system
of parks. In each case, the organization must acquire, usually
through its own resources, the information it thinks it needs in
order to act; it must devise a plan of action; it must reach stable
agreements over ends and means with those who have the power
to obstruct or delay action; it must take action or achieve a correct blend of action and inaction; and it must be judged on the
results. In both the private and public sectors, organizations
with purposes must achieve a proper fit between ends, means,
and resources if they wish to succeed on the terms in which their
success is measured.
When we speak of a purposive decisionmaker as having "judgment" we really mean to say that he or she has an ability to see
the likely future consequences of present actions; this kind of
judgment translates into an ability to design and implement successful courses of action. When we speak of a lawyer as having
"judgment" we mean much the same thing. Considered as actors
in the world, lawyers are purposive decisionmakers who have a
great deal more in common with other purposive decisionmakers
than with the courts, which are decisionmakers with authority
but not purposes. One reason for putting law students in contact
with competent purposive reasoning therefore, is to expose them
to good models of the kind of thinking they will have to do
themselves.
Law students who spend their professionally formative years
studying appellate decisions may gain a peculiar view of how
competent thinking is done. Courts are not purposive institutions, and consequently judges are unusual among mature decisionmakers. The judiciary does not, or at any rate claims that it
does not, set out to achieve goals other than those of deciding
the cases that come before the courts in accordance with correct
legal principles appropriately ordered. Nor do judges behave as
though they had institutional purposes. The law moves forward
on the individual case. I do not mean to deny that some individual judges have coherently purposive agendas, nor to imply that
judicial lawmaking is not informed by considerations of policy,
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only that the judicial institution as a whole cannot be accused of
having systematic objectives that it seeks to achieve in its development of legal rules. Certainly the judicial branches of the fifty
state governments do not set out for themselves purposes and
protocols for designing systems of laws. It is nearly inconceivable, for example, that a state supreme court might issue directives to the lower courts instructing them on how to decide tort
cases in a manner that contributes to reducing the incidence of
drunk driving.
In addition to not having explicit purposes, courts do not set
their own agendas nor gather information with respect to the
disputes that come before them, but rather must rely on the
parties to define the issues and to come forward with information that meets judicial standards. Courts also have institutional
autonomy, constitutionally conferred: they do not have to negotiate in advance with other institutions or with the public over
what to do in a particular case or in a line of cases, having only
to defend themselves against post hoc criticism. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, courts do not for the most part even
know what happens to disputes or parties after the case has ended, and would be shocked to be evaluated on the "success or
failure" of their legal principles.
Judicial reasoning is consequently a special type of reasoning,
designed almost exclusively around the tasks of dispute resolution, more akin to moral philosophy than to management. Purposive decisionmaking, by contrast, is generally concerned with
prospective action, therefore with uncertainty, risk, and consequence, and with the ordering of principles under pressure; the
decisionmaker is generally less concerned with "applying standards" or "weighing evidence" than with projecting and predicting. I do not mean to suggest that purposive decisionmakers are
superior to judicial decisionmakers, only different from them. I
do suggest, however, that without some appreciation of purposive decisionmaking it is very difficult to understand what is going on in the world or to participate intelligently in shaping
action.
This set of perceptions leads me to suggest that law students
ought to be exposed to courses the subject matter of which is an
institution or set of institutions (e.g., financial institutions or
hospitals) studied as a system of ordering in its own right and
not simply as the fodder for judicial analysis. Let me make some
suggestions for course design based on areas with which I am
familiar. A course on health law is an appropriate forum for an
institutional approach, since the health care sector is governed
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through an elaborate network of interrelated private associations
and public agencies that accredit institutions, credential professionals, allocate hospital staff privileges, ·set standards of practice, insure patients against medical expenses, and the like. The
health care arena also involves leading-edge issues of law in areas as diverse as antitrust and bioethics.
There are two main methods of proceeding in designing a
health law course. The first, which has been standard, has been
to organize the course as an exploration of those areas in which
courts have decided to make "law" to govern the behavior of
health care providers. 18 In such a course, hospitals, nurses, and
doctors are seen through a set of vignettes narrated by judges.
The vignettes may lead to judicial discussion of malpractice liability, or the allocation of hospital staff privileges, or price-fixing
among doctors, or the like; but the topics selected for discussion
are those that have found their way into appellate opinions. The
health care institutions themselves are in the background.
The other method of designing the course, which I prefer, is to
approach the health care institutions as an interlocking system
of private and quasi-public governments, with their own purposes, intra-industry relationships, dispute resolution forums,
and decisional standards. From this vantage point, health care
providers' encounters with the judicial system are experiences
with an external sovereign; judicial standards are foreign elements to which internal adjustments must be made. The institutions' need to deal with judicially imposed medical malpractice
liability, for example, relates to their internal management problem of assuring adequate medical quality control; and the question to be asked about the current system of malpractice adjudication is whether it stimulates or retards the health care
industry's own efforts to raise the quality of care. Likewise, the
problem of health care financing and regulation through health
insurance programs presents opportunities for students to think
about designing and financing social programs that create incentives for desired performance on the part of beneficiaries and
providers. The question of how far courts should go in overseeing the allocation of hospital staff privileges becomes an issue of
epistemology as well as fairness: is it appropriate to ask medical
people to translate their way of "knowing" whether a practitioner delivers adequate quality care into lawyers' ways of
"knowing" in order to comply with courts' notions of due pro13. See, e.g., W.
1982).
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cess or fair consideration? What is the strength of the legal principle that would force wholesale judicialization of the staff allocation process?
The study of decisionmaking by nonjudicial institutions
presents good opportunities for students also to learn about purposive dispute resolution-that is, dispute resolution that is part
of a process of management or governance, in which the most
decisive considerations may be not the rights of the parties or
the ordering of abstract principles considered apart from their
consequences, but rather the degree to which various possible
outcomes are likely to contribute to some purpose such as preserving the health of an organization or an ongoing relationship
between the parties. In the staff privilege area, the hospital staff
is frequently called upon to decide not so much whether the doctor seeking privileges is "qualified" but whether, knowing how
he or she has performed in the past, the staff is confident of his
or her ability to perform competently in the future, and to play
the role within the institution that the institution desires. The
problem is not one of applying standards but of predicting behavior, which is a different matter.
Perhaps the most important aspect of this kind of learning is
the opportunity it provides for students to imagine themselves
playing roles in decisionmaking under the normal conditions
that obtain in nonjudicial settings, in which the information
available to the decisionmaking process is less abundant in
quantity and less circumscribed in type than the information
typically made available to courts, and the decisionmaker must
bear the cost of gathering the necessary information and the risk
of making an erroneous decision on inadequate information. Finally, the study of decisionmaking in purposive institutions
would help students to appreciate the difference between exercising retrospective judgment, that is, allocating praise, blame,
gain, or loss arising out of past actions, and exercising prospective judgment, that is, making predictions of future events and
recommendations for future courses of action.
At the bottom of all of this, my interest is in having law students gain respect for the intelligence exercised by responsible
persons who are not lawyers. Because the courts have the last
word, and because the judgments they render are based on
sometimes painstaking analysis of past events, it is too easy for
law students who are immersed in court decisions to assume the
role of critic. Legal analysis is characteristically negative and
critical, sometimes in picayune respects, leading students to believe that the smartest person is the person who most success-
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fully identifies the defects in the other person's argument. Negative judgment taken at leisure without responsibility is, however,
a great deal easier to exercise than positive judgment made
under pressure with responsibility; 14 law students see too much
of the first and not nearly enough of the second, though much of
the judgment that they themselves will have to exercise in their
professional careers is of the second type. If I have a central purpose in making these suggestions, it is to get law students out of
their enforced passivity and into the mode of exercising active
intelligence while they are still in law school. At least, we could
start them more securely on the road to professional
competence.

14. See Wald, Thoughts on Decisionmaking, 87 W. VA. L. REv. 1 (1984).

